The empirical relationship between trade protection and economic growth is surprisingly fragile, as shown in a number of other papers. After demonstrating this empirical sensitivity, we address one possible explanation for these findings: that the relationship is nonlinear. Following the endogenous growth literature, we test for the possibility that the relationship between trade barriers and growth is contingent on measures of comparative advantage. The findings suggest that these nonlinearities do in fact exist -in particular, the correlation between tariffs and growth is strongest and positive for capital-abundant countries -and are robust to the choice of control variables.
Introduction
There is a widespread belief, among economists, policy makers, and the general public, that more open economies grow faster than closed economies. Many international organizations emphasize this correlation; for example, the World Trade Organization proclaims on its website that it has "helped to create a strong and prosperous trading system contributing to unprecedented growth." 1 Among economists, Anne Krueger is representative in stating that, "trade liberalization offers the only known way to escape from the ever-slowing growth rates of developing countries." 2 However, the empirical evidence is mixed. Supporting the positive correlation between openness and growth, Sachs and Warner (1995) demonstrate a strong, positive relationship between growth and a variable they construct to indicate an "open" economy. Using an instrumental variables approach based on geographical factors, Frankel and Romer (1999) find a large, positive (although not strongly statistically significant) correlation between trade openness and growth. Lee, Ricci, and Rigobon (2004) use "identification through heteroskedasticity" and find that openness has a positive, but small, effect on growth, controlling for the positive effect of growth on openness. Edwards (1998) shows a consistently positive relationship between growth and nine measures of openness. Harrison (1996) finds a positive relationship between a number of measures of openness and growth in a panel study of developing countries. In a sample of 81 industrialized and developing countries, Lee (1993) finds that trade distortions (tariffs and black market premia) lower both the growth rate and the investment rate.
Anecdotal evidence, such as the frequently cited comparison between the outwardoriented, fast-growing East Asian economies and the stagnating Latin American economies focused on import substitution strategies, also supports the belief that trade protection and growth are negatively related. However, a number of papers have cast doubts on the strength 1 "The WTO in Brief," http://www.wto.org 2 Krueger (1998). of this relationship. In their classic sensitivity analysis of growth regressions, Levine and Renelt (1992) fail to find a robust relationship between growth and any trade or international price-distortion variable (although a positive correlation between the trade-output ratio and the investment ratio is one of their few robust findings). Vamvakidis (2002) finds no evidence of a positive relationship between trade openness and growth prior to the 1970s.
In a study of ten countries over the period 1860 -1913 , O'Rourke (2000 finds that tariffs and growth were positively correlated. Similarly, Clemens and Williamson (2002) demonstrate that the high tariff barriers of pre-1914 Latin America were accompanied by rapid subsequent growth, while low tariffs and low growth prevailed in Asia during this period. Greenaway, Morgan, and Wright (1997) Papers such as Harrison and Hanson (1999) , Clemens and Williamson (2004) , and Rodríguez and Rodrik (2000) demonstrate directly a lack of robustness in the relationship between trade policy and growth. Harrison and Hanson (1999) demonstrate the fragility of previous empirical results that rely on the Sachs and Warner (1995) index of openness, concluding that the difficulty in establishing a link between trade reform and growth is due largely to the lack of good objective data on trade policies across countries. Clemens and Williamson (2004) demonstrate a positive relationship between tariffs and growth prior to World War II; the relationship reverses during the post-War period. Rodríguez and Rodrik (2000) conduct an extensive critical review of some of the more widely cited papersprimarily Sachs and Warner (1995) , Dollar (1992) , Ben-David (1993) , and Edwards (1998)- that have shown an empirical link between less trade protection and faster growth. They conclude that this link has not been convincingly demonstrated, and they remain "skeptical that there is a strong negative relationship in the data between trade barriers and economic growth, at least for levels of trade restrictions observed in practice" (p. 316).
In general, the empirical growth literature has downplayed trade variables in its work.
For example, the variable most closely related to trade in Barro (1991) is the purchasingpower-adjusted investment deflator. Levine and Renelt (1992) cite trade policy as an example of a variable frequently omitted entirely from growth studies. Many empirical growth studies have included measures of terms-of-trade shocks to proxy for changing international conditions, following Barro and Lee (1994) , although these shocks are not intended as proxies for openness.
Perhaps it is not surprising that empirical work has failed to identify a strong negative correlation between trade protection and growth, because theory does not generally provide an unambiguously negative relationship. For example, in the neoclassical Solow model, trade policy has no effect on steady-state growth. In addition, in endogenous growth models in open-economy frameworks, the relationship between trade policy and growth is frequently a contingent one; in Grossman and Helpman (1990) and Matsuyama (1992) , among others, the effect of trade barriers on growth depends on the pattern of comparative advantage across countries.
Despite this, empirical examinations of the relationship between trade and growth have until recently allowed only for linear relationships. A notable exception is DeJong and Ripoll (2006) , who investigate the relationship between tariffs and growth and its contingency on income levels. In a panel of 60 countries, they find that the negative correlation between tariffs and growth holds only among higher-income countries. A second exception is Papageorgiou (2002) , in which trade openness is a threshold variable separating countries into distinct growth regimes; however, openness is not directly included in his growth specification, but operates indirectly, as a separating variable.
The focus of this paper is somewhat different. First, much of the theoretical motivation for considering nonlinearities is based on the idea that trade protection may direct factors of production into more or less productive sectors, depending on the pattern of comparative advantage. We investigate the effect on total factor productivity (TFP) growth as well as the effect on growth in income per worker.
Unlike DeJong and Ripoll (2006) , who focus primarily on income as the source of the contingent relationship, we follow the endogenous growth literature and also allow for the possibility that the relationship between trade barriers and growth is contingent on the pattern of comparative advantage. 4 Relying on the pattern of comparative advantage, rather than income, as the source of differences in the correlation between growth and tariffs is closer to the predictions of endogenous growth models, although we do include income levels in some specifications as an additional control variable. We also examine a longer time period (a 20-year cross-section, instead of 5-year dynamic panels). Since the pattern of comparative advantage is unlikely to change much over short periods of time (but the timing of business cycle fluctuations across countries may be affected by the pattern of comparative advantage), we think that examining the correlation over a longer period of time is more likely to uncover how the relationship between trade protection and growth varies according to comparative advantage. Unlike Papageorgiou (2002) , we focus on the potential nonlinearity of the direct relationship between trade barriers and growth. We find evidence that such nonlinearities do, in fact, exist, in that the relationship between tariffs and growth is contingent on the pattern of comparative advantage, and this effect is stronger than the contingency based directly on income. Our results provide some support for the predictions of Grossman and Helpman (1990) , in that tariffs are positively correlated with growth in countries with a comparative advantage in manufactured goods.
Our paper is also related to Nunn and Trefler (2009) , who examine the relationship between the skill bias of a country's tariff structure (the degree to which tariffs favor the country's skill-intensive industries) and economic growth. We focus on how the correlation between overall tariffs and growth varies across countries with different patterns of comparative advantage.
In what follows, section 2 demonstrates the sensitivity of conventional regressions of tariff protection on growth. In section 3, we discuss theoretical reasons to suspect a nonlinear relationship between trade protection and growth. Section 4 presents the empirical analysis allowing for nonlinearities in the relationship between tariff protection and growth, and we conclude in section 5.
Trade Barriers and Growth: Conventional Empirics
The question addressed in this paper is whether countries with lower barriers to international trade have higher growth rates, controlling for other country characteristics. Despite the conventional wisdom that such a correlation exists, it does not generally appear in the data. To illustrate this, Table 1 Because of such statistically insignificant results, many researchers have concluded that average tariffs, despite being an obvious and direct measure of trade restrictions, are an inappropriate measure of trade policy. For example, it is well known that simple calculations of (import-weighted) average tariffs tend to underestimate the "protectiveness" of trade policy, since import volume tends to be lower in industries with high tariffs. In response, (2000) argument that average tariffs are a reasonable measure of trade restrictiveness persuasive, and so use average tariffs as the measure of trade barriers in this paper.
Theoretical Background
A large body of work links openness to growth. Two centuries ago, Adam Smith observed that the specialization allowed by trade leads to increased productivity. Indeed, there is a standard presumption on the part of economists that lower trade restrictions will lead to increased incomes and higher growth. This is based primarily on the well-known result that in static models of trade, free trade is the first-best policy. Thus, most trade economists expect an unambiguous, negative relationship between trade barriers and long-run growth.
However, this presumption is incomplete. For example, if one assumes a standard Solow growth model with diminishing marginal returns and exogenous technological progress, then trade barriers have no effect on the steady-state rate of growth. It is true that episodes of trade liberalization, which increase a country's level of real GDP, can increase growth in the short run as the economy transitions to a new higher steady-state level of output (also see the empirical evidence presented in the introduction to this paper). However, even these positive short-run effects come with caveats as, in the presence of market failures or externalities, trade liberalization could also potentially reduce output, negatively affecting growth in the short-run. Thus, neither standard static welfare models nor conventional economic growth models provide an unambiguous prediction of a negative correlation between trade barriers and long-run growth.
This raises the question of whether such an unambiguous relationship can be found in the endogenous growth literature. Again, the answer is no. Specifically, in models of endogenous growth, where growth is generated through factor accumulation or endogenous technological change, the effect of trade barriers on growth is contingent on country characteristics. This contingent relationship can be illustrated by considering two standard citations : Grossman and Helpman (1990) and Matsuyama (1992) . Both papers model the effects of trade on endogenous growth in a small country with no cross-border knowledge spillovers. 5 Matsuyama (1992) presents an endogenous growth model in which a single factor of production, labor, is used to produce two goods: a primary good and a manufactured final good. Knowledge accumulation occurs in the manufacturing sector through learning-bydoing that is external to individual firms but internal to the manufacturing sector as a whole, so that innovation in the economy is a function of the size of the manufacturing industry. A direct implication of this framework is that trade, which reduces the size of the manufacturing sector in countries with a comparative advantage in primary goods production, could potentially reduce the rate of knowledge accumulation (and hence growth). In contrast, in countries with a comparative disadvantage in primary goods production, trade results in an expansion of the manufacturing sector as resources flow to the exporting side of the economy. Thus, countries that specialize in manufacturing will see a corresponding increase in the rate of knowledge accumulation, and therefore an increase in growth, due to trade.
Alternatively, Grossman and Helpman (1990) assume that technological innovation occurs not through learning-by-doing in a manufactured final good sector, but rather through research and development in a non-traded intermediate input sector. Specifically, Grossman and Helpman (1990) assume two factors of production, skilled and unskilled labor, which are used in three sectors: a primary goods sector, a manufacturing sector and a (non-traded) intermediate input sector. Human capital in this framework can be used to produce either in the manufacturing sector or to perform R&D in the intermediate input sector. As in Matsuyama (1992) , trade causes resources to flow into the manufacturing sector in those countries which have a comparative disadvantage in primary goods production (i.e., the skilled-labor abundant countries). However, in contrast to Matsuyama (1992) , this resource reallocation will reduce the rate of technological innovation as it pulls resources (i.e., skilled labor) out of the R&D sector. Likewise, trade increases the rate of R&D in countries that specialize in primary goods production as skilled labor is freed up to move to the intermediate input sector.
There are several lessons that can be drawn from the endogenous growth literature.
First, as Grossman and Helpman (1990) and Matsuyama (1992) illustrate, small changes in the underlying assumptions of the model can result in drastically different conclusions.
Thus, rather than attempting a precise structural estimation of any particular model, we follow the conventional growth literature by running reduced-form growth regressions to investigate possible correlations between tariff barriers and GDP growth.
Second, as can be seen in these two examples, the effects of trade barriers on growth depend crucially on how trade reallocates resources in the economy. However, the effect of trade on resource allocation also depends fundamentally on a country's particular pattern of comparative advantage. The direct implication of this is that one should look for a contingent relationship between trade barriers and growth when analyzing cross-country data. Thus, in Section 4, we examine whether the correlation between growth and tariffs varies depending on the levels of variables that proxy for a country's pattern of comparative advantage.
Empirical Setting and Results
Following Hall and Jones (1999) , among others, we assume that output in country i is produced according to:
where K i and H i represent stocks of physical and human capital, and A i is the level of total factor productivity (TFP). The stock of human capital is given by H i = h i L i where h i is the average human capital per worker and L i is the number of workers used in production.
The data on output (GDP) and the labor force are taken from Penn World Tables mark 6.1. Physical capital stocks are constructed by using the standard perpetual inventory method with a six percent depreciation rate. The average human capital per worker is given by h i = e φ(Ei) , where E i denotes years of schooling and φ(E) represents the efficiency of a unit of labor with E years of education. The data on average years of schooling for the population aged 25 and above are taken from Barro and Lee (2002) ; and following Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare (2005), we assume that φ(E i ) = 0.085E i and α = 1/3. 6 The appendix provides a more complete description of the data.
An obvious problem with investigating potential nonlinearities in the relationship between tariff barriers and growth is that the number of potential model specifications is nearly infinite while the available data are much more limited. Thus, in this paper, we concentrate on incorporating interaction terms into conventional growth regressions to allow the marginal effect of tariff barriers on growth to differ across countries. Based on the endogenous growth literature, this marginal effect should be different in countries with different patterns of comparative advantage. We extend the conventional growth regression literature by estimating the following specification: We consider three variables that may affect the marginal correlation between tariffs and growth. First, the pattern of comparative advantage in a country is fundamentally a function of the relative abundance of various resources. Thus, we consider capital per worker and skill intensity as two potential Z variables. Skill intensity is measured by the fraction of the population that completed at least secondary school. 8 The assumption is that countries endowed with different levels of resources will exhibit different patterns of comparative advantage, and thus have different marginal tariff effects. As a final proxy variable, we use the percentage of exports that are primary goods as a direct means of proxying for comparative advantage in primary, rather than manufactured, goods.
We present the results of this regression in Table 2 . Regression 1 follows a traditional growth specification, including initial log output per worker, investment, human capital, average population growth rate, and openness (total trade/total output) as control variables. 9
The variables of interest, of course, are our measures of comparative advantage -capital, skill intensity, and primary exports -interacted with tariffs. Since interaction terms like of skill intensity reduces the influence of these observations. However, our results are not sensitive to using the alternative measure of skill intensity.
9 Excluding population growth rate and openness from the regressions does not significantly affect our results. these can pick up the correlation between the dependent variable and the components of the interaction term, we also include skill, capital, and primary exports entered linearly. 10
Regression 2 adds four geography variables from Sachs and Warner (1995) , and Regression 3 includes these geography variables and six measures of the quality of governance from Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2008) (see Appendix for their descriptions). In Regression 3, the most fully specified model, the coefficient on tariffs entered linearly is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level, while the marginal effect of tariffs on growth estimated at the means of skill intensity, capital per worker, and primary exports is positive and statistically significant at the 10% level. Interestingly, the coefficient estimate on the capital stock interacted with tariffs is positive and statistically significant, even with the capital stock entered linearly into the regression (the coefficient on the capital stock is also statistically significant). Table 3 presents the marginal effects of tariffs on growth as the level of the capital stock varies, estimated from Regression 3 of Table 2 . For computing the marginal effects as the capital stock varies, we assume that skill intensity and primary exports are at their mean values of 0.147 and 0.668 respectively. At higher levels of capital per worker, the correlation between average tariff rates and economic growth is positive and statistically significant. The correlation is positive and statistically significant for 46 of the 85 countries Notes: All other variables from Regression 3 of Table 2 are also included. Results do not differ significantly if we use ln(K/Y ). Marginal effects are the calculated effect from the regression of the combined linear and interaction terms, estimated at the values of capital per worker given in the first column (minimum, maximum, and quartiles), given that primary exports, income per worker, and skill are at their mean values (0.147, 9.26, and 0.668 respectively). Standard errors appear in parentheses.
in the sample (54%). At low levels of capital per worker, the relationship becomes negative, although the estimated marginal effect is negative and statistically significant for only one country in the sample. To interpret the magnitude of these coefficient estimates, note that an increase of one standard deviation (0.081) of tariffs would translate into a predicted increase in growth of 0.00008 at the 25th percentile of capital per worker (log capital per worker equal to 8.41); at the 75th percentile (log capital per worker equal to 10.91), the prediction would be an increase of 0.011. 11
Thus, the results of Table 2 Although capital intensity more closely parallels the spirit of the endogenous growth theories discussed in Section 3, we ran a supplementary regression including initial log in-11 In the sample, the mean (log) growth rate is 0.008, with a standard deviation of 0.019.
come per worker interacted with tariffs as a comparison to DeJong and Ripoll (2006) . In panel data over five-year periods, DeJong and Ripoll (2006) found that the correlation between tariffs and growth was contingent on the level of income. Including an interaction term between income and tariffs does not change the quantitative or qualitative results of Table 2 , as seen in Table 4 ; the coefficient estimate on the interaction term between tariffs and capital remains statistically significant and positive, while the coefficient on the income interaction term is not statistically significant. The regression in Table 4 includes the additional variables in Regression 3 of Table 2 , but only the key results are presented. 12 Panel B
of Table 4 includes the marginal effects when the income interaction term is included; these are analogous to the results in Table 3 , and are qualitatively very similar. To summarize, the results in Table 4 suggest that the relationship between tariffs and growth depends more strongly on the level of capital than on the level of income.
It should be noted that a positive correlation between tariff barriers and growth does not necessarily imply that protection is optimal from a welfare standpoint. As Grossman and Helpman (1990) take pains to note, even though under certain circumstances trade may lead to a decline in the rate of innovation in their framework, a country can still benefit from engaging in trade. Specifically, in their model, international trade provides both the standard static efficiency gains from specialization as well as the opportunity to consume differentiated goods from abroad. Thus, the above results should not be treated as a positive statement about the desirability of trade protection, but rather as a normative statement about the observed correlation between tariff barriers and output growth. Table 5 presents results when the dependent variable is TFP growth. The analysis based on TFP growth is important, because in the endogenous growth models discussed in Section 3, the mechanism through which tariffs affect growth is by reallocating resources to more (or less) productive sectors of the economy. According to Regression 3 in Table 5 , the direct correlation between trade barriers and TFP growth is negative. However, the results in this regression also indicate that a country's pattern of comparative advantage affects the marginal effect of tariff barriers on TFP growth. Table 6 gives marginal effects from the productivity regressions of tariffs on TFP growth, computed from Regression 3 of Table 5 . Although the correlation again starts out negative at low levels of capital per worker, the negative correlation is never statistically significant.
The correlation is positive and statistically significant for 57 of the 85 countries in the sample (67%).
Concluding Remarks
The motivation behind this paper lies in the confusing and contradictory literature concerning the impact of trade on growth. Despite years of study and numerous empirical attempts, researchers have been unable to establish an unambiguous negative correlation between trade barriers and growth. In this paper, we argue that the reason for such disappointing results is that, theoretically, no such unambiguous relationship exists. Rather, as a quick study of the endogenous growth literature shows, the impact of trade barriers on growth depends on how trade reallocates resources through the economy. Thus, in both Grossman and Helpman (1990) and Matsuyama (1992) , whether trade has a positive or negative impact depends on the pattern of comparative advantage in the country being analyzed.
By allowing the overall effect of trade barriers on growth to differ across countries based on the pattern of comparative advantage, we find that tariff barriers are most strongly and positively correlated with growth in capital-abundant countries. This contingent relationship is in line with the predictions of Grossman and Helpman (1990) , and is shown to be robust to multiple alternative specifications.
Appendix: Data Description and Sources
The following set of 94 countries are used in our regressions reported in Table 1 . The data on primary exports are not available for Botswana, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Indonesia, Israel, Lesotho, Nepal, and Zaire; consequently, we use the remaining 85 observations in estimating equation (2).
• North Africa and Middle East: Egypt, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia.
• Sub-Saharan Africa: Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Comoros, Congo, Cote D'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Tables 3  and 5 .
Mauritius, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zaire, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
• America: Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Paraguay, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, USA, and Venezuela.
• East & South Asia: Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Japan, and Korea, Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, and Thailand.
• Europe: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey.
• Oceania: Australia, Fiji, New Zealand, and Papua New Guinea.
The following list defines variables used in the tables, indicates their sources, and explains how we construct them, where relevant. Table A .1 reports the descriptive statistics.
• y : GDP per worker. The data on output and labor supply are from Penn World Tables v.6.1 (PWT6.1). For Cyprus, Singapore, and Sierra Leone, output data are not available for the most recent years. Consequently, in calculating the average annual growth rates of these countries, the final is the most recent year for which the data is available.
• k : Capital per worker. Using the investment series data from PWT6.1, capital stock data are constructed with standard perpetual inventory method with 6 percent de-
